India’s Nuclear Security Crisis A Call for Urgent International Oversight and Reform.

India’s Nuclear Security Crisis A Call for Urgent International Oversight and Reform.

🔍 Introduction

India is recognized globally as one of the major nuclear powers. However, over the past two decades, a troubling pattern has emerged: a series of incidents involving the theft, illegal possession, and black-market trading of nuclear and radioactive materials. These recurring events raise urgent concerns regarding the security of India’s nuclear assets, and demand attention not only from New Delhi, but also from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the global non-proliferation community.

📉 Pattern of Nuclear Material Thefts in India

India has experienced over 20 confirmed incidents of uranium or other radioactive material theft since the 1990s. These incidents highlight repeated failures in physical protection, insider threats, and systemic oversight weaknesses.

🔥 Major Incidents (With References):

Year Location Material Involved Weight Details

1994 Meghalaya Uranium 2.5 kg Smugglers claimed links to a DAE scientist [StrafAsia]

1998 West Bengal Uranium 100 kg Politician involved in smuggling [Modern Diplomacy]

2008 Jharkhand Uranium 4 kg Smuggled across Indo-Nepal border

2021 Mumbai Uranium 7 kg Seized from black-market dealers

2021 Jharkhand Uranium 6.4 kg Arrested individuals had confirmed buyers

2024 Bihar Caesium 50 g Seized from a local gang, worth over ₹8.5 billion

2025 Dehradun Radioactive Device N/A Allegedly stolen from BARC; recovered after arrest

🔗 Sources: StrafAsia, Modern Diplomacy, Friday Times, NTI Reports, Indian Police Reports

🔐 Security Gaps and Institutional Weaknesses

🛑 1. Insider Threats

Many cases involved employees of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) or local collaborators, suggesting severe flaws in background checks and facility access control.

🧱 2. Lack of Independent Oversight

India’s nuclear regulator, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), operates under the DAE, creating a conflict of interest. In comparison, other countries like the U.S. have independent nuclear regulators (e.g., NRC).

🛡️ 3. Limited International Inspections

India has not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, and many of its nuclear facilities remain outside IAEA safeguards, allowing significant latitude in material accounting.

🕳️ 4. Black Market Vulnerability

Radioactive material has been actively trafficked on the black market. Once out of domestic control, it may fall into the hands of:

• Rogue states like North Korea or Iran

• Terrorist organizations seeking “dirty bomb” components

• Non-state actors using material for extortion or disruption

🌐 Global Implications

Had such incidents occurred in countries like India, Iran, or North Korea, the international community would have reacted with sanctions or direct diplomatic interventions. However, India has largely been spared scrutiny due to:

• Its strategic alliances with the U.S., France, Israel

• Membership in multilateral groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (waived restrictions in 2008)

This double standard undermines the credibility of global non-proliferation efforts and opens dangerous precedents.

✅ Recommendations for India and the International Community

🇮🇳 A. Recommendations for India

1. Reform AERB into an Independent Authority

Separate the regulatory body from the DAE to ensure objective oversight.

2. Sign the IAEA Additional Protocol

Enable more intrusive inspections and transparency under global norms.

3. Enhance Personnel Reliability Programs

Implement robust vetting and psychological screening for all nuclear employees.

4. Improve Material Accounting Systems

Adopt IAEA-compliant nuclear material accounting and tracking technologies.

5. Allow Peer Reviews and Joint Exercises

Invite IAEA and NTI teams for periodic security audits and simulations.

🌍 B. Recommendations for the IAEA and Global Powers

1. Enforce Equal Standards for All States

Treat all nuclear-armed states equally — including India — under safeguards.

2. Offer Technical Assistance for Security

Help India improve cybersecurity, inventory control, and physical barriers through technical aid.

3. Establish a South Asian Nuclear Security Forum

Include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal under a regional confidence-building initiative for radiological material control.

4. Mandate Reporting of All Theft Incidents

The IAEA should require states to report any radioactive material loss within 24 hours to a central global registry.

⚖️ Conclusion: A Wake-Up Call

India stands at a nuclear crossroads. While it seeks to project itself as a responsible nuclear state, the pattern of radioactive material thefts suggests that its internal security architecture is inadequate and outdated.

It is time for India to:

• Embrace international norms,

• Commit to full transparency,

• And work with—not against—international watchdogs like the IAEA.

If these reforms are ignored, the risk of a catastrophic nuclear or radiological incident—either through terrorist use, state misuse, or accidental exposure—will only increase.

The world cannot afford such a lapse.

Nuclear safety is not just India’s responsibility—it’s a global imperative.

📚 References:

• IAEA Safeguards Overview (www.iaea.org)

• StrafAsia: The Danger Inside: India’s Black Market Uranium

• Modern Diplomacy: Incidents of Uranium Theft in India

• The Friday Times: India’s Uranium Theft Crisis

• WITS World Bank: India Export of Uranium Compounds (https://wits.worldbank.org)

By:

Syed Ali Raza Shah Naqvi Bukhari

Founder & Chairman, Tehreek Istehkam Pakistan

Author of “Social Democratic System,” “Law of God,” and “Multiculturalism”

Advocate of Third-Party Democracy and People’s Welfare